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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs. 
FRANK LIFANG, 
Case No. 940717- CA 
Category No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdictional authority 
pursuant to § 78-2(a)-3 (2) (d), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the Utah Stalking Statute, U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 
(Repl. 1995), is violative of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution because it is vague and overbroad both facially and 
as applied to the defendant? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Frank Lifang, was charged by the City of 
Provo with stalking, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-5-106.5 (Repl. 1995) and Provo City Ordinance 
9-76-5-106.5. 
The Honorable Judge Stephen L. Hansen, Judge of the Fourth 
1 
Judicial District Court, Provo Department, State of Utah ordered 
a psychological evaluation of the Defendant. The Defendant was 
evaluated and found competent to stand trial. 
The Defendant, by and through his counsel of record 
submitted a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Utah Stalking 
Statute, codified in U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5, was unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad. The parties appeared before Judge Hansen on 
September 20, 1994 for a non-jury trial. Having heard the 
testimony of witnesses and arguments of counsel at trial, on 
October 11, 1994, the court issued a ruling which denied the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, found the State had met its burden 
of proof, and found the Defendant guilty of the crime of 
stalking. 
The Defendant, by and through counsel, filed a Notice of 
Appeal on November 15, 1994. 
STATEMENT OP PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Honorable Judge 
Stephen L. Hansen, Fourth Circuit Court, Provo Department, State 
of Utah, rendered on October 11, 1994. The Defendant appeals 
both the trial court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss and its 
verdict of guilty. 
STATEMENT OP THE PACTS 
(All references are to the transcript of the trial as such 
transcript has been paginated by the certified shorthand 
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reporter.) 
The Defendant, Mr. Frank Lifang, was charged with stalking 
Mrs. Kelly Roring subsequent to a confrontation instituted by the 
Defendant between himself and Mrs. Roring that took place at the 
Physician's Plaza, at the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center in 
Provo, Utah, on May 26, 1994 (page 51). The Defendant and Mrs. 
Roring became acquainted when they were both employed at the 
Provo Care Center in Provo, Utah in January of 1991 (page 17). 
After the Defendant's employment at the Provo Care Center 
terminated in April or May of 1991, he continued to maintain 
contact with Mrs. Roring, including calling her house (page 25), 
hiding in her yard (31), and leaving threatening notes on her car 
(page 39), which behavior culminated in a confrontation on May 
26, 1994 (page 51). 
Mr. and Mrs. Roring both testified that they had told the 
Defendant to stay away from Mrs. Roring (page 31, page 84). On 
April 14, 1994 the Defendant was served by Mrs. Roring's attorney 
with a copy of a Permanent Injunction enjoining the Defendant 
from bothering, harassing, or annoying Mr. or Mrs. Roring (page 
127). The Defendant testified that he understood he was not 
supposed to have any contact with Mr. or Mrs. Roring, but 
initiated contact subsequent to the issuance of the injunction 
anyway (page 246-47). 
On May 26, 1994 at 10:30 a.m., Mrs. Roring was crossing the 
parking lot at the Physicians Plaza when the Defendant approached 
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her from behind (page 53). The Defendant began swearing at Mrs. 
Roring, shouting, and throwing his arms about (page 53-54). At 
one point he told Mrs. Roring he was willing to die over this 
matter and he was going to take someone with him (page 55) the 
Defendant's words and actions were such that another employee in 
the parking lot was alarmed and notified hospital security (page 
154) . 
The security officer that responded testified at trial that 
he interpreted the Defendant's conduct as threatening (page 165). 
A Provo police officer who also responded to the call testified 
that when he arrived the Defendant was agitated (page 176) and 
Mrs. Roring was very upset by the incident (page 177). The 
officer invited the Defendant to come down to the police station, 
the Defendant agreed, and the officer read him his Miranda rights 
(page 178-79). The officer took the Defendant's statement (page 
180-83), during which the Defendant again made the statement that 
if he was going to die, he would take someone with him (page 
182) . 
The officer interviewed the Rorings on the following day, 
obtained police reports from Orem regarding the Defendant, and 
spoke with the Defendant's probation officer (page 183). Based 
on his investigation, the officer charged the Defendant with 
stalking under Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-106.5. 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Stalking Statute is not overbroad because it does 
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not make a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
activity unlawful. The Appellant lacks the standing to mount a 
facial overbreadth challenge because he is not alleging the 
statute is overbroad as applied to his circumstances. He cannot 
make a facial overbreadth challenge under a First Amendment 
standing exception either because he has not shown that the 
statute implicates a substantial amount of First Amendment 
protected speech. Even if the Appellant has the standing for a 
facial overbreadth challenge, he has failed to carry his burden 
of proving that the overbreadth of the statute is real and 
substantial. 
The Utah Stalking Statute is also not unconstitutionally 
vague, because it defines in terms an ordinary person would 
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. The 
Appellant cannot claim the statute is vague in relation to his 
own conduct because his conduct falls clearly within the 
legitimate application of the statute. The statute is also not 
facially vague because the statute has a specific intent 
requirement, a reasonable person standard, and concrete terms 
describing prohibited conduct. 
Other states with stalking statutes have also heard 
challenges to those statute's constitutionality on grounds of 
overbreadth and vagueness. The vast majority of the states have 
upheld their statutes in the face of these challenges. Because 
Utah's Stalking Statute is neither overbroad nor vague, it does 
not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
5 
United States and Utah Constitutions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-5-106.5 HAS THREE COMPONENTS FOR A 
DEFENDANT TO BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR STALKING. 
A. The Act Component 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-106.5 (2)(a) says: 
A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person. . . Id. at (2)(a). 
To be held criminally liable under § 76-5-106.5, a defendant must 
have done something voluntary. By designating certain types of 
acts as stalking and requiring the state to prove that the 
defendant performed these acts, the legislature assures that the 
person being charged with stalking is not merely a bystander, but 
a criminal actor. 
The legislature further identified acts which constitute 
stalking by including a definition of "course of conduct" in the 
statute. It defines "course of conduct" as: 
repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity 
to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written 
threats or threats implied by conduct or a combination 
thereof directed at or toward a person. Id. at (1)(a). 
This definition gives specific notice of what types of acts will 
make the defendant criminally culpable. 
B. The Threat Component 
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The threat component of the Utah stalking statute is found 
within the definition of "course of conduct" cited above. Id. 
It is not an additional requirement to the act component, but is 
an alternative manner of fulfilling the "course of conduct" 
portion of the act component. To fulfill the act component, a 
defendant can either maintain a visual or physical proximity to 
the victim, or he can convey a threat to the victim. The threat 
component requires that a defendant communicate a verbal, 
written, implied by conduct, or combination threat to a specific 
person. 
This requirement helps to "remove innocent and 
constitutionally protected activity from the scope of the 
statute." M. Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws 
Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 769, 
779 (1994). Because a threat may subject a defendant to criminal 
liability under some other statutes, including it in the stalking 
statute helps to eliminate vagueness problems the statute might 
face. See e.g.r U.C.A. § 76-5-102 (Repl. 1995) (criminal assault 
is a threat accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence), U.C.A. § 76-5-106 (Repl. 1995) (criminal harassment is 
communicating in writing a threat to commit any violent felony), 
U.C.A. § 76-5-107 (Repl. 1995) (penalty for threat against life 
or property). 
C. The Intent Component 
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U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 requires two types of intent: general 
and specific. General intent requires only that the "offender's 
actions be voluntary." M. Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws 
Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 769, 
779-80 (1994). The "intentionally" or "knowingly" language of 
the Utah statute indicates the general intent requirement. M. 
Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vaaue or 
Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 769, 779-80 (1994). The 
"intentionally" or "knowingly" language in the Utah statute 
comprises the general intent requirement. U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 
(2) (a) (Repl. 1995). By requiring the state to prove the 
defendant acted intentionally or knowingly, the legislature 
assures that the statute is not going to proscribe merely 
reckless or negligent conduct. To be criminally liable, the 
defendant has to voluntarily engage in the course of conduct 
prohibited by the stalking statute. 
Specific intent is a "special mental element that goes 
beyond that required with respect to the offenders actions. . . . 
[it] requires that the offender have an additional culpable 
mental state." Boychuk, at 780. The Utah stalking statute's 
specific intent requirement is encompassed in the language 
requiring the defendant to engage in a course of conduct 
"directed at a specific person" with the knowledge that the 
specific person will "be placed in reasonable fear of bodily 
injury" or "will suffer emotional distress". U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 
(2) (b) (I)-(ii) (Repl. 1995). By requiring that the defendant's 
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actions be directed toward a specific person, with the intent 
that his actions cause a particular effect, the defendant can be 
presumed to be on notice that his actions constitute a crime. 
II. U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD 
BECAUSE IT DOES NOT MAKE UNLAWFUL A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OP 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITY. 
A. Standard of Review 
When an appeal rests solely on questions of law regarding 
the constitutionality of a statute, the appellate court gives "no 
particular deference to the rulings of the circuit and district 
courts on any of the points presented.11 Provo City Corp. v. 
Willden 768 P. 2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). However, in deciding for 
itself the constitutionality of U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5, the 
appellate court must accord a strong deference to the statute 
because "legislative enactments are presumed to be 
constitutional." Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake 817 P. 2d 
816, 819 (Utah 1991). Because of this presumption of 
constitutionality, the appellant bears "the burden of 
demonstrating its unconstitutionality." Id. 
B. Facial Overbreadth 
An appellant challenging the constitutionality of a statute 
because of its overbreadth may allege either that the statute is 
overbroad in respect to the particular appellant's conduct, or 
that it is facially overbroad and chills the exercise of 
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constitutionally protected activities. The appellant in this 
case does not specifically allege that his conduct was 
constitutionally protected and that the Utah stalking statute 
unconstitutionally made unlawful that conduct. Instead, this 
appellant attempts to mount a facial overbreadth challenge to the 
statute, claiming that the statute "proscribes activities that 
are clearly constitutional under basic free speech rights." 
(Brief for Appellant at 10). 
l. The defendant lacKg standing f<?r a facial 
overbreadth challenge. 
To claim facial overbreadth, the appellant must first 
establish his standing to make the challenge. The traditional 
rule regarding standing in constitutional adjudication is 
described by the Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahomaf 413 U.S. 
601 (1973) when it states that: 
a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be 
applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on 
the ground that it may conceivably be applied 
unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not 
before the Court. Id. at 410. 
The appellant is not arguing that the statute cannot be 
constitutionally applied to him. Instead he creates a 
hypothetical situation involving a service provider and a 
dissatisfied client where the statute might be unconstitutionally 
prohibitive of constitutionally protected activities. (Brief for 
Appellant at 10). 
The appellant might have standing to adjudicate the 
potential claims of those not before the court if the overbreadth 
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challenge falls within one of the exceptions provided by the 
Supreme Court. This exception that the appellant is claiming is 
the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. (Brief for Appellant 
at 7). This doctrine is based on the "sensitive nature of 
protected expression." New York v. Ferberr 458 U.S. 747, 768 
(1982). 
To properly invoke the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, 
however, the defendant must first show that constitutionally 
protected First Amendment speech is involved. If a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct is not at issue, 
then the facial overbreadth challenge must fail. Village of 
Hoffman Estates Vt Flipside, Hoffman Estates, inc., 455 u.s. 489, 
494 (1982). 
The Supreme Court said these types of overbreadth 
challenges are usually "entertained in cases involving statutes 
which, by their terms, seek to regulate 'only spoken words.1" 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) quoting Gooding 
v. Wilson 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972). They also might be allowed 
where "rights of association were ensnared in statutes which, by 
their broad sweep, might result in burdening innocent 
associations." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
Neither of these First Amendment rights is implicated in the 
Utah Stalking Statute. The Utah statute does not regulate speech 
alone, but speech accompanied by conduct. The statute's 
definition includes "repeatedly conveying verbal or written 
threats," U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 (1) (a), but the mere utterance of 
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these words is not enough to create liability under the statute. 
The words must be accompanied by conduct in the form of 
addressing them to a specific person with the intent or knowledge 
of causing that person to fear injury or suffer emotional 
distress. Id. at (2) (a)-(c). 
Even if a defendant could be convicted of stalking by merely 
uttering the words, with no additional conduct involved, the 
types of words he would utter—threats—are not constitutionally 
protected speech. Threats have not been specifically identified 
as a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment. 
See, etgt, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 u.s. 568 (1942) 
(fighting words), Miller V, California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) 
(obscenity), Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) 
(libel), Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement). 
However, conveying a threat has been criminalized in other 
statutes, so a potential defendant is unlikely to feel the 
stalking statute significantly chills the exercise of speech 
which is otherwise criminal. See, e.g., U.C.A. § 76-5-102 
(criminal assault), U.C.A. § 76-5-106 (criminal harassment), 
U.C.A. § 76-5-107 (threat against life or property). 
The Utah Stalking Statute also does not burden innocent 
associations to the extent that a facial overbreadth challenge is 
warranted. The Appellant claims the statute could be construed 
to include innocent associations with people we regularly come in 
contact with. (Brief for Appellant at 10). However, the intent 
requirement of the Utah Stalking Statute would take these types 
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of innocent associations out of the purview of the statute. The 
Utah stalking statute requires both a specific and a general 
intent to commit the acts constituting the elements of the crime. 
See supra, i.e.. 
By requiring the course of conduct to be intentional and 
specifically directed at a particular person, someone who simply 
maintains a coincidental physical or visual proximity to a 
particular person, with no intent or knowledge to maintain that 
proximity or cause the person to fear injury or suffer emotional 
distress is not going to be criminally liable under U.C.A. § 76-
5-106.5. 
Since the Utah Stalking Statute does not significantly 
constrict First Amendment speech or association rights, the 
Appellant has no basis for mounting a facial overbreadth 
challenge. If the Appellant is not alleging that the statute is 
overbroad in its application to his circumstances, and the 
statute does not touch any First Amendment protected activities, 
then the Appellant has no standing to challenge the statute 
either for himself or for others not before the court. 
2. If the Appellant has standing to make a facial 
overbreadth challenge to the statute, he hag 
failed tQ meet hig burden of dewQngtrating the 
statute's unconstitutionality. 
Even if the court determines that some First Amendment 
protected activities are implicated in the operation of the Utah 
Stalking Statute, warranting a facial overbreadth challenge, the 
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Defendant has not met his significant burden of proving the 
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
The Supreme Court has held that the facial overbreadth 
doctrine is "strong medicine" and has been "employed by the Court 
sparingly and only as a last resort." Broadrick v. Oklahoma 413 
U.S. 601, 613 (1973). The Appellant must prove that a 
"substantial" amount of constitutionally protected activity is 
being proscribed by the statute in order to overcome the 
statute's presumption of constitutionality. Village of Hoffman 
Estate? Vt Flipside, HQffman Estate?, Inc., 455 u.s. 489, 494 
(1982). In addition, the Superior Court of Connecticut in State 
v. Culmof 642 A. 2d 90 (1993), where a defendant challenged the 
constitutionality of Connecticut's stalking statute, found that 
the state's interest in criminalizing stalking was a compelling 
interest. Id. at 101. In fact, the court said that "[p]roviding 
protection from stalking conduct is at the heart of the state's 
social contract with its citizens". Id. at 102. 
In light of the state's interest in protecting its citizens 
and in not having every statute subjected to a constitutional 
challenge, the Broadrick Court established a threshold standard 
the appellant must meet in a facial overbreadth challenge. The 
Court said that: 
particularly where conduct and not merely speech is 
involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute 
must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged 
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
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In Broadrickr which involved a challenge to an Oklahoma law which 
prohibited state employees from certain political activities, the 
Supreme Court found that the "strong medicine11 of a facial 
overbreadth invalidation was not warranted. The majority held 
that "whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through 
case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its 
sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied." Id. at 615-16. 
To succeed in a facial overbreadth challenge the Appellant 
must prove that the Utah Stalking Statute is substantially 
overbroad and that no limiting construction can be placed on the 
statute. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). The 
Appellant has not met his substantial burden in failing to 
provide the court with evidence that the Utah Stalking Statute's 
overbreadth is real and substantial. 
The Appellant has posed a hypothetical scenario in an 
attempt to meet that burden, but the scenario does not describe 
constitutionally protected conduct that would be criminally 
proscribed by the stalking statute. (Brief for Appellant at 10). 
The Appellant's scenario indicates that if a dissatisfied client 
of a service provider repeatedly complains about the quality of 
the service to the provider, knowing or intending the result to 
be emotional distress, then the client could be criminally liable 
for stalking. The Appellant is correct in his determination that 
under the statute this type of behavior would constitute 
stalking. However, the Appellant is incorrect in assuming that 
this behavior is constitutionally protected. A person who 
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repeatedly and intentionally or knowingly maintains a visual or 
physical proximity or communicates a threat, whether their reason 
for doing so is because of a relationship gone awry, or because 
they are dissatisfied with a good or service, does not have a 
constitutionally protected right to intentionally or knowingly 
cause another person to fear bodily injury or suffer emotional 
distress. While a dissatisfied client has the right to complain 
about goods or services, the Utah Stalking Statute requires that 
the conduct reach the level such that a reasonable person would 
fear bodily injury or suffer emotional distress before it 
constitutes a criminal action. 
In addition to failing to present any credible evidence that 
the statute's overbreadth is real and substantial, the Appellant 
has also failed to prove that any limiting construction the court 
could put on the statute would be insufficient to cure its 
overbreadth. 
The language of the Utah Stalking Statute itself provides 
the court with the limiting construction it needs to assure that 
the statute is applied only to the type of conduct the 
legislature found odious enough to criminalize and not to 
innocent, constitutionally protected conduct. The statute 
requires the fact finder to determine that a defendant's conduct 
in repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity or 
communicating a threat to a specific person be such that a 
reasonable person would fear bodily injury or suffer emotional 
distress from the conduct. U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 (2) (a) (I)-(ii) 
16 
(Repl. 1995). It is not enough for the fact finder to determine 
that the victim actually did suffer emotional distress or fear 
bodily injury; if a reasonable person would not have reached the 
same conclusions about the defendant's conduct, then the 
defendant committed no criminal act. 
3. Other jurisdictions have upheld their stalking 
statutes in actions alleging facial 
unconstitutionality. 
In City of Dayton v. Smith, 646 N.E. 2d 917 (Ohio Mun. 1994) 
the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the charges 
against him for stalking, stating that the defendant had not 
shown the Ohio stalking statute included a substantial amount of 
protected conduct. Id. at 920. 
Likewise, in other, earlier cases in Florida, Virginia, and 
Connecticut, the courts have held those states' stalking statutes 
are not unconstitutionally overbroad. The Florida appellate 
court in Pallas v. State 636 So. 2d 1358 (1994) questioned the 
defendant's standing to raise an overbreadth challenge, but 
concluded that even if he did have standing, the statute was not 
overbroad in its use of the term "follows" as an element of the 
offense of stalking. Id. at 1364. The court said the term 
"follows" is "directed primarily at conduct, not First Amendment 
expression." Id. Therefore, the court found that this portion 
of the statute did not meet the Broadrick standard of real and 
substantial overbreadth which outweighed the statute's legitimate 
sweep. Id. 
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The Court of Appeals of Virginia also upheld that state's 
stalking statute against an overbreadth challenge in Woolfolk v. 
Commonwealth 447 S.E. 2d 530 (1994). In response to the 
defendant's claim that the Virginia Stalking Statute is broad 
enough to reach constitutionally protected activities, the court 
employed a narrowing construction to the statute. Id. at 852. 
The court decided to construe the statute as proscribing only 
conduct, with no legitimate purpose, engaged in with the intent 
to cause emotional distress by putting the victim in fear of 
death or bodily injury. Id. The court said such a narrowing 
construction is "not strained and prevents the possibility of 
overbreadth." Id. 
The Superior Court of Connecticut in State v. Culmo, 642 A. 
2d 90 (1993) denied the defendant standing to raise a facial 
overbreadth challenge because the court said he had not met the 
threshold requirement of proving that the statute regulated 
expression and not merely conduct. Id. at 103. Since the First 
Amendment protects speech and not conduct, which is subject to 
regulation by the state, when a statute proscribes intentional 
conduct and not speech, there is no basis for a facial invalidity 
challenge. Id. 
More recently, in Culbreath v. State, 1995 WL 217573 (1995), 
the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals evaluated its stalking 
statute in light of case law from other jurisdictions and other 
research, and found the statute not unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Id. at 6. The court noted that the Alabama statute's resembled 
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the California statute in requiring an intent, a threat, and an 
act, 
III. THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
EITHER FACIALLY OR AS APPLIED TO THIS DEPENDANT BECAUSE IT 
CLEARLY DEFINES WHAT CONDUCT IS PROHIBITED. 
After the court decides on the facial overbreadth challenge, 
if it fails, then the court should turn to the facial vagueness 
challenge to a statute. The Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman 
Estates Vi Flipside, Hoffman Estates, incT, 455 u.s. 489 (1982) 
says after the court turns to this facial vagueness challenge: 
assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally 
protected conduct, [the court] should uphold the 
challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague 
in all of its applications. A plaintiff who engages in 
some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain 
of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct 
of others. Id. at 494-95. 
Because the Court requires standing to raise a vagueness 
challenge, the Court said it should first "examine the 
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical 
applications of the law." Id. 
If this Court, in determining the validity of the 
Defendant's overbreadth challenge, decides that no First 
Amendment rights are implicated in the operation of the statute, 
then the Defendant must prove the statute is vague in all 
circumstances, including the Defendant's. Regardless of whether 
or not the court finds First Amendment rights at issue, it should 
consider first the statute as it applies to the Defendant's 
conduct before considering other, hypothetical circumstances. 
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A. The Utah Stalking Statute Is Not Impermissibly Vague as 
Applied to This Defendant 
The Supreme Court defined the void-for-vagueness doctrine as 
requiring that a criminal statute "define the criminal offense 
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited"• Kolender v. Lawson 461 U.S. 352, 
357 (1983). To prove that the Utah Stalking Statute is vague as 
applies to him, the Defendant would have to show that the statute 
did not alert him that his actions were criminally prohibited. 
The Defendant in this case can make no such claim. His 
conduct is of the type clearly proscribed by the statute. The 
Defendant's conduct in visually and physically maintaining a 
close proximity to the victim was not only in violation of the 
Utah Stalking Statute, it was also in violation of a permanent 
injunction. The Defendant testified that he understood from the 
victim's attorney that he was to have no contact with the victim. 
(Transcript at 244) . But even knowing this, he also testified 
that he intentionally initiated contact with the victim after he 
had knowledge that he was not to have any contact with her. 
(Transcript at 245). 
Having admitted that he intentionally contacted the victim 
after he knew he was legally prohibited from doing so, the 
Defendant cannot claim that his conduct was innocent or that he 
did not know the conduct was prohibited. The language of the 
permanent injunction says the Defendant has agreed "to be 
permanently enjoined from bothering, harassing, annoying, 
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threatening or harming" the victim. (Judgment Granting Permanent 
Injunction at 2, see attached addendum). It also states that the 
Defendant agrees that he may be "restrained from coming in, onf 
or around the plaintiff's residence, place or employment or any 
place where plaintiff may be present." (Judgment Granting 
Permanent Injunction at 2, see attached addendum). The 
Defendant's actions in violating the Permanent Injunction are 
clearly proscribed by the stalking statute. Therefore, he cannot 
claim that the same conduct he knew was proscribed by the 
Injunction was not sufficiently described in the stalking statute 
to put him on notice that the conduct was proscribed by the 
statute. 
To challenge a statute for vagueness, which does not 
implicate constitutionally protected conduct, the Defendant must 
prove that the statute is "impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). If the Defendant cannot 
prove that the statute is vague regarding his own conduct, that 
his conduct does not fall within the clear proscriptions of the 
statute, then his vagueness challenge must fail. 
B. The Utah Stalking Statute Is Not Facially Vague 
To avoid a vagueness challenge, a statute must be 
worded such that: (1) an ordinarily intelligent person has a 
reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, and 
(2) it provides explicit standards so that the statute cannot be 
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applied arbitrarily or discriminatorily by law enforcement. 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The 
concern if statutes are worded too vaguely is that if the 
ordinary person is not sure what conduct will be criminal, their 
uncertainty might inhibit the exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms. Id. at 109. 
In analyzing a statute for vagueness, however, the courts 
have acknowledged the strong presumption of validity of a statute 
and the dilemma of the legislature. The Florida District Court 
of Appeals describes this dilemma as, "to draft with narrow 
particularity is to risk nullification by easy evasion of the 
legislative purpose; to draft with great generality is to risk 
ensnarement of the innocent in a net designed for others." 
Pallas v. Statef 636 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (1994). Because of this 
dilemma, the Florida court said the Supreme Court "will not 
ordinarily invalidate a statute because some marginal offenses 
may remain within the scope of a statute's language." Id. 
(quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-31, 
at 1033-34 (2d ed. 1988). 
The Utah Stalking Statute explains clearly, in terms the 
average person can understand what actions constitute the crime 
of stalking. The statutefs requirement of a specific intent 
assures that the average person will not accidentally be 
criminally liable for seeing the same person on the street twice 
as the Appellant claims (Brief for Appellant at 12). If the 
state cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person has 
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a specific intent to keep the victim in physical or visual 
proximity and cause them to fear bodily injury or suffer 
emotional distress, then the person has not engaged in criminally 
proscribed conduct. The Connecticut Superior Court in State v. 
Culmo 642 A. 2d 90 (1993) said that the specific intent 
requirement in their state's stalking statute "significantly 
vitiates any claim that its purported vagueness could mislead a 
person of common intelligence into misunderstanding what is 
prohibited." Id. at 98. 
The reasonable person standard of section 76-5-106.5 also 
eliminates any claims to vagueness. The state must prove that a 
reasonable person would, based on the defendant's course of 
conduct, fear bodily injury or suffer emotional distress. U.C.A. 
§ 76-5-106.5 (2)(a) (I)-(ii) (Repl. 1995). This requirement 
eliminates the possibility of subjectivity in enforcement of the 
law because it is an objective standard. If an alleged victim 
reacts unreasonably to ordinary contact, then an ordinary person 
who maintains a visual or physical proximity with the alleged 
victim, even if that proximity is intentional, will not be 
criminally liable under the statute. The reasonable person 
standard assures that the individual's right to free association 
is not constrained by the statute. 
The terms of the Utah Stalking Statute are also 
significantly concrete enough to withstand vagueness allegations. 
Other states' stalking statutes have been challenged for 
vagueness because of their use of terms such as "harass" or 
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"follow". See, <3tgt, Pallas v. State. 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 
Dist. ct. App. 1994), cvtlbreath v. State, 1995 WL 217573 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1995). However, Utah's statute employs terms that are 
substantially more concrete. Rather than "follows", Utah uses 
the phrase "repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical 
proximity." U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 (1) (a) (Repl. 1995). Rather 
than "harasses", Utah uses the phrase "intentionally or knowingly 
engages in a course of conduct". Id. at (2) (a). 
The Utah Legislature, in drafting section 76-5-106.5 must 
have anticipated potential vagueness challenges. In anticipation 
of these challenges, the legislature included in the revised 
stalking statute a specific intent requirement, a reasonable 
person standard, and concrete language which the ordinary person 
would understand and would, therefore, be able to avoid so as not 
to be criminally liable for stalking. 
C. Other States Have Upheld the Constitutionality of 
Their Stalking Statutes By Denying Facial 
Vagueness Challenges 
Ohio, Alabama, Florida, Connecticut, Illinois, and Virginia 
have all recently upheld their state's stalking statutes in the 
face of constitutional challenges that the statutes are facially 
vague. See, City of Dayton v. Smith, 646 N.E. 2d 917 (Ohio Mun. 
1994), Culbreath v. State, 1995 WL 217573 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), 
Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), 
State v. Culmor 642 A. 2d 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993), People V, 
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Halt, 649 N.E. 2d 571 (111. App. Ct. 1995), Woolfolk v. 
Commonwealth/ 447 S.E. 2d 530 (va. ct. App. 1994). 
Many of the statutes withstanding these challenges contain 
language considerably less concrete and specific than that in the 
Utah Stalking Statute. In light of the singular failure of 
appellants in other states to prove their states1 stalking 
statutes unconstitutional and the Utah Legislature's care in 
drafting the Utah statute, it seems apparent that the Utah 
statute can also withstand a vagueness challenge. 
IV. THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION THEREFORE IT IS NOT 
INVALID FACIALLY NOR AS APPLIED TO THE DEFENDANT. 
The Defendant has failed to meet his rather substantial 
burden of proving the Utah Stalking Statute is either 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad in the face of its presumed 
constitutionality. Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P. 
2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). Having failed to meet this burden, the 
Defendant cannot allege that the statute violates the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. The statute is neither unconstitutionally broad 
nor vague, therefore, the Defendant cannot allege that finding 
him criminally liable under the Utah Stalking Statute violates 
his equal protection or due process rights. The Defendant does 
not make any other showing that the statute was applied to him 
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discriminatorily or unconstitutionally, therefore his claim for a 
reversal of his conviction must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
The state has a significant interest in prohibiting its 
citizens from conduct that causes another citizen to fear for 
their physical safety or to suffer emotional distress. The Utah 
Stalking Statute was carefully drafted by the Utah Legislature to 
protect citizens from repeated, unwanted contact or threats from 
someone they fear might do them harm or causes them emotional 
distress. 
The statute does not proscribe constitutionally protected 
activity nor coincidental contacts made during the course of 
everyday life. It requires the person charged with stalking to 
act repeatedly with purpose, knowledge, and intent. It requires 
the conduct to be directed at a particular person and that that 
person be reasonably fearful or distressed resulting from that 
conduct. 
In this case the Appellant has asked this Court to find the 
statute he was convicted of violating unconstitutional because it 
is overbroad and vague. However, the Appellant has failed to 
overcome the statute's presumption of validity by showing its 
alleged overbreadth is "real and substantial" or that its 
vagueness is such that the statute is invalid in all its 
applications. He has also failed to prove that his conduct had a 
legitimate purpose and should not have been criminally proscribed 
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by the legitimate confines of the statute. This Court should, 
therefore, deny the challenges to the Stalking Statute's 
constitutionality and uphold the Appellant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this 17 day of August, 1995, 
GaryqcGij 
for 
Vernon F.l^ (Rick) Romney 
Attorney for Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certified that I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee to Thomas H. 
Means, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, at 43 East 200 North, PO 
Box MLM, Provo, UT 84603-0200 this 1\*t day of August, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-106.5 (Repl. 1995) 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Sections 7, 24 
Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction, Kellie W. Rorina v. Frank 
Lifang 
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76-5-106.5 CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, C.J.S. — 86 C.J.S. Threats & Unlawful Com-
Blackmail, and Threats § 57 et seq. munications § 1. 
76-5-106.5. Definitions — Crime of stalking. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or 
physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written 
threats or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at 
or toward a person. 
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any 
other person who regularly resides in the household or who regularly 
resided in the household within the prior six months. 
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at 
a specific person that would cause a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or 
a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person. 
(3) Stalking is a class B misdemeanor. 
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor if the offender: 
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking; 
(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is 
substantially similar to the offense of stalking; or 
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any 
crime in another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony, 
in which the victim of the stalking was also a victim of the previous felony 
offense. 
(5) Stalking is a felony of the third degree if the offender: 
(a) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of 
stalking; 
(b) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or 
jurisdictions of offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of 
stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of 
offenses under Subsections (5)(a) and (b); or 
(d) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in 
Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if 
committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which the victim of the stalking 
was also a victim of the previous felony offenses. 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 76-5-107.5 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-106.5, enacted by L. detailed comparison is impracticable and added 
1992, ch. 188, § 1; 1994, ch. 206, § 1. Subsections (4) and (5) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch 188 
ment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsec- became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to 
tions (1) and (2) to such an extent that a Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25 
76-5-107, Threat against life or property — Penalty. 
(1) A person commits a threat against life or property if he threatens to 
commit any offense involving violence with intent to: 
(a) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency 
organized to deal with emergencies; 
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or 
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or room; place of 
assembly; place to which the public has access; or aircraft, automobile, or 
other form of transportation. 
(2) A threat against life or property is a class B misdemeanor, except if the 
actor's intent is to prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building, a place to 
which the public has access, or a facility of public transportation operated by 
a common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-107, enacted by L. Act, hijacking, bombing and other offenses, 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-107; 1988, ch. 38, § 1. §§ 76-10-1501 to 76-10-1511. 
Cross-References. — Bus Passenger Safety 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31A Am. Jur 2d Extortion, A.L.R. — Validity and construction of terror-
Blackmail, and Threats § 57 et seq istic threat statutes, 45 A.L.R.4th 949. 
C.J.S. — 86 C J.S Threats & Unlawful Com-
munications § 1. 
76-5-107.5. Prohibition of "hazing" — Definitions — Pen-
alties. 
(1) "Hazing" means any action or situation that, for the purpose of initiation, 
admission into, affiliation with, or as a condition for continued membership in 
any organization: 
(a) recklessly or intentionally endangers the mental or physical health 
or safety of any person; 
(b) willfully destroys or removes public or private property; 
(c) involves any brutality of a physical nature such as whipping, 
beating, branding, forced calisthenics, or exposure to the elements; 
(d) involves forced consumption of any food, liquor, drug, or other 
substance or any other forced physical activity that could adversely affect 
the physical health and safety of the individual; 
(e) involves any activity that would subject the individual to extreme 
mental stress, such as sleep deprivation, forced exclusion from social 
contact, forced conduct that could result in extreme embarrassment, or 
any other forced activity that could adversely affect the mental health or 
dignity of the individual; or 
(f) involves brutality toward or willful mistreatment of any animal. 
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AMENDMENT 14 
Section 1. Citizens of the United States. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. Representatives—Power to reduce apportionment. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to 
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, 
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in 
such State. 
Sec. 3. Disqualification to hold office. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, 
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Sec. 4. Public debt not to be questioned—Debts of the Confeder-
acy and claims not to be paid. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But 
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or 
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Art. I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Abjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
J.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2. 
A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=> 82; 
Weapons *» 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 24 
project did not unconstitutionally grant bene-
fits to private individuals; any benefits were 
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Age of majority. 
Agent for service of process. 
Automobile license law. 
Construction with Art. VI, § 26. 
Contract carrier permit. 
Cosmetologists* license law. 
Criminal actions. 
—Investigations. 
—Prosecution. 
—Sentence. 
Criminal sentence. 
Disparate tax assessments. 
Excess revenue refunds. 
Guest statutes. 
Inheritance Tax Law. 
Insurance premium tax exemption. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Licenses. 
Massage parlor ordinance. 
Municipal employment prerequisites. 
Notice requirements. 
Property. 
—Responsibility for water service. 
Public employees' retirement system. 
Public officers' bonds. 
Public officers' salaries. 
Road poll tax. 
School activities. 
Search warrants. 
Sunday closing laws. 
Tax sales. 
Unfair Practices Act. 
In general. 
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever 
uniform laws can be enacted. State v. 
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 
696 (1921). 
Objects and purposes of law present touch-
stone for determining proper and improper 
mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 540 R2d 499 (Utah 1975). 
classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 
P.2d 920,117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. & 
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 
(1941). 
One who assails legislative classification as 
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such. 
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Classification is never unreasonable or arbi-
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features so 
long as there is some basis for differentiation 
between classes or subject matters included, as 
compared to those excluded, provided differen-
tiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of 
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Before legislative enactment can be inter-
fered with, court must be able to say that there 
is no fair reason for the law that would not 
require equally its extension to those which it 
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Only where some persons or transactions ex-
cluded from operation of law are, as to the sub-
ject matter of the law, in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary 
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis 
to differentiate can be found, law must be held 
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas-
sification does not render statute unconstitu-
tional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 
Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941). 
In determining whether classification made 
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimina-
tion is very essence of classification and is not 
objectionable unless founded upon unreason-
able distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948). 
An act is never unconstitutional because of 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26. 
§§ 9 to 23. Key Numbers. — Franchises «=> 11. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
History: Const. 1896. vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri- 26. 
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KING & ISAACSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
A Professional Corporation 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Telephone: (801) 532-1700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KELLIE W. RORING, ) 
) JUDGMENT GRANTING 
Plaintiff, ) PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
vs. ) Civil No. 940901302CV 
FRANK LIFANG, ) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Defendant. ) 
Plaintiff in the above-entitled case, commenced an action in 
the above-entitled Court against the above-named defendant 
praying that defendant refrain from certain acts complained in 
the Complaint, and more particularly set forth herein. 
A Temporary Restraining Order was given by order of this 
Court, made and entered on February 24, 1994. Because it was not 
possible to personally serve the defendant with the Temporary 
Restraining Order issued on said date, a Second Temporary Rest-
raining Order was issued by the Court on March 4, 1994, and 
defendant was personally served with said Second Temporary Rest-
raining Order as well as Summons and Complaint on March 7, 1994. 
The defendant, having been informed of his right to seek 
legal representation through an attorney of his choice, has 
entered his appearance herein and waived the statutory time in 
which to answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff's Complaint, 
and has consented that Judgment by Default may be entered against 
him at any time and without further notice to him. 
Further, by his Appearance and Consent on file herein, the 
defendant has agreed that he will not bother, harass, annoy, 
threaten or harm the plaintiff at her place of residence, 
employment or any other place in person or by telephone, and he 
has agreed to not to come in, on, or around the plaintiffs 
residence, place of employment or any place where plaintiff may 
be present. 
By his Appearance and Consent, defendant has agreed that he 
may be permanently enjoined from bothering, harassing, annoying, 
threatening or harming the plaintiff at her place of residence, 
employment or any other place in person or by telephone, and that 
he may be restrained from coming in, on, or around the 
plaintiff's residence, place of employment or any place where 
plaintiff may be present. 
In additon, in his Appearance and Consent, the defendant has 
acknowledged that any appropriate peace officer shall render any 
necessary assistance to the plaintiff and that violations of any 
of the provisions of this permanent injunction may be deemed 
contemptuous and that the defendant could be punished 
accordingly. 
Based upon the above and upon the Court's review of all the 
papers in this file, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, and because of the irreparable harm which plaintiff 
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could suffer if the defendant were to "get even" and carry out 
other threats he has made as set forth in the Complaint and 
plaintiffs Affidavit on file herein, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendant, 
Frank Lifang, is hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from 
bothering, harassing, annoying, threatening or harming the 
plaintiff at her place of residence, employment or any other 
place in person or by telephone, and said defendant, Frank 
Lifang, is permanently enjoined from coming in, on, or around the 
plaintiff's residence, place of employment, or any place where 
plaintiff my be present; and in regard to this permanent 
injunction, any appropriate peace officer shall render any 
necessary assistance to the plaintiff* 
Violation of any of the provisions mentioned herein may be 
deemed contemptuous and the defendant could be punished 
accordingly. 
This Judgment granting permanent injunction shall be binding 
upon the parties to this action, their officers, agents, 
servants, employees and attorneys and upon those persons in 
active concert or participation with them who receive notice, in 
person or through counsel, or otherwise, of this Judgment 
Granting Permanent Injunction. 
DATED this ( day of March, 1994. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the iC4U day of March, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment Granting 
Permanent Injunction was mailed to the defendant, Frank Lifang, 
at 650 North Atlantis Drive, Orem, Utah 84057, by placing the 
same in the United States mails, postage prepaid. 
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